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Abstract
This paper presents two ‘non-welfarist’ approaches and one ‘wel-
farist’ approach to decompose changes in inequality and social welfare
into three components. We distinguish the contributions of popula-
tion, tax policy and labour supply behavioural eﬀects. As an illus-
tration, we decompose changes in inequality and in values of a social
welfare function in Australia between 2001 and 2006. Inequality is ﬁrst
deﬁned in non-welfarist terms as a function of disposable income: the
independent judge places no value on leisure. Then this is modiﬁed to
allow for evaluations using a weighted geometric mean of disposable
income and leisure. This is seen to modify the evaluation of changes
in important ways. Furthermore, the results are shown to be quite
diﬀerent from those obtained using a ‘welfarist’ evaluation in terms
of money metric utility, where separate behavioural eﬀects cannot be
isolated.
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11 Introduction
In evaluating changes in inequality, or some other index such as a poverty
measure, the usual situation is that the investigator has cross-sectional survey
data for two years, marking the start and end of the period under investiga-
tion. It is desirable to distinguish the eﬀects of government policy changes,
particularly concerning the direct tax and transfer system, from those aris-
ing from changes in the structure of the population between the relevant
years. Such population eﬀects cover a wide range, including changes in the
age, occupational, educational and demographic structure. A behavioural
microsimulation model is particularly useful for this purpose, since it is able
to provide information about the simulated labour supply (and the corre-
sponding net incomes) of individuals in a range of counterfactual situations.
A tax policy change designed to inﬂuence the distribution of net income may,
for example, be frustrated by endogenous labour supply responses. Alterna-
tively a tax change may be made in an attempt to inﬂuence labour supply,
and it is important to be able to distinguish those changes from the redis-
tributive eﬀect of the tax structure alone. An illustration of the value of
a microsimulation model for measuring diﬀerent components of changes in
the distribution of disposable incomes is provided by Bargain (2010), who
decomposes changes following the framework proposed by Shorrocks (1999),
w h i c hi nt u r ni si n ﬂuenced by Shapley (1953).1
Components examined by Bargain (2010) include ceteris paribus changes
arising from tax-induced changes to labour supply between the two periods,
the ceteris paribus changes arising from the changing structure of the popu-
lation itself between the two periods, and ﬁnally the ceteris paribus changes
1The Shapley value approach has also been implemented to decompose inequality by
income source and population subgroups. For example, Mussard (2006) provides such
decompositions for the Gini index using Italian data for 1989 and 2000. However, without
a microsimulation model, it is not possible to disentangle the changes due to the changing
structure of the underlying population and the changes due to other factors (such as policy
changes). The static decomposition has been used by Deutsch et al. (2006) to examine
occupational segregation. On the decomposition, see also Sastre and Trannoy (2002)
and Cowell and Fiorio (2009). Gunatilaka and Chotikapanich (2006) examined inequality
trends in Sri Lanka using the approach with a regression-based model.
2arising from the change in the tax structure alone.2 A crucial aspect of
the decomposition is the need to distinguish carefully among the several al-
ternative ways to obtain the ceteris paribus requirement, using a range of
counterfactuals. Bargain used a structural discrete hours approach to labour
supply modelling. The random utility component means that a probability
distribution over available hours of work is generated for each individual,
and Bargain based disposable incomes for each case on the arithmetic mean
hours for each individual.3
Following Bargain (2010), the present paper provides a decomposition
of the inequality of disposable income in Australia for the period between
2001 and 2006. However, instead of using each individual’s expected hours
of work, this paper bases inequality measures on the ‘pseudo distribution’
method proposed by Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2006) to obtain a close
approximation of the full distribution. The use of disposable income may be
said to involve a ‘non-welfarist’ approach, in which the evaluation (made by
a disinterested judge whose value judgements are summarised by the social
welfare function implicit in the inequality measure) does not attempt to
place any value on leisure consumed by individuals. However, going beyond
this ‘non-welfarist’ approach is not straightforward given the fundamental
diﬃculty arising in specifying a suitable welfare metric. Here, Bargain’s
approach is extended by proposing two alternatives, one of which is non-
welfarist while the other can be described as ‘welfarist’.
In the basic optimal tax model, the speciﬁcation of a suitable welfare met-
ric is straightforward given the choice of cardinalisation of utility, where there
are common preferences, particularly for leisure. But heterogeneous prefer-
ences present serious diﬃculties when making social evaluations, as shown by
Donaldson (1992) and Blackorby et al. (1993). One approach has recently
been suggested by Aaberge and Colombino (2008) and Ericson and Flood
2Any change in inequality resulting from a ‘growth eﬀect’ (an equal proportional change
in incomes and all tax and beneﬁt thresholds) is negligible. This homogeneity property is
discussed further below.
3Bargain (2010, p. 8) suggested that ‘averaging individual supply responses over a
large number of draws provides robust transition matrices’. However, on limitations of
using the average, see Duncan and Weeks (1998) and Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2006),
who provide comparisons using simulations.
3(2009).4 Both studies use a discrete hours structural approach to modelling
labour supply, allowing for a substantial amount of population heterogeneity.
However, the welfare metric used in their social welfare function is a value
of utility based on an independently estimated utility function (expressed in
terms of disposable income and hours of work) which is considered to be the
same for all individuals; they regard it as a common utility function.5 This
may be viewed as ‘welfarist’, using a diﬀerent utility function for the welfare
metric compared with that used to obtain labour supply. Alternatively, the
common ‘utility’ function can be viewed as simply a weighting function in
a non-welfarist approach that gives some weight to hours of work as well as
disposable income. The present paper proposes the alternative interpretation
in which social welfare is expressed as a function of individuals’ net income
and leisure, using the same weighting function for all individuals, rather than
attempting to use any kind of common utility measure.
The problems of aggregating heterogeneous preferences suggest that a
cardinalisation of utility based on ‘money metric utility’ (for a given set of
‘reference prices’) is unlikely to satisfy the strong conditions needed to guar-
antee a concave social welfare function. However, for comparison purposes
the present paper also reports the use of a decomposition based on money
metric utility (taking the initial tax structure as reference). This is therefore
a ‘welfarist’ approach. A modiﬁcation to the decomposition method is needed
because, in this case, separate behavioural and tax policy eﬀects cannot be
distinguished.
Section 2 explains the decomposition method used. This clariﬁcation is
needed as the approach has received relatively little attention and, as shown
here, much care is needed in setting out the alternative counterfactual cases.
Section 3 reports results for Australia, using disposable income. Section 4
4For further explanation and discussion, see Decoster and Haan (2010). They compare
alternative welfare metrics based on the use of various nested sets based on a ‘real wage’
metric, a ‘reference wage’ metric, and a ‘Rente criterion’ (based on net income intercepts
of indiﬀerence curves).
5Blundell and Shephard (2009) adopt a social welfare function based on a common
(isoelastic) utility transformation. They simplify the resulting expression for the aggre-
gate, allowing for the stochastic utility component, which follows a Type-I extreme value
distribution.
4proposes a method of carrying out the decomposition using a social welfare
function based on both disposable income and leisure. Results comparable
with those of section 3 are also reported. Section 5 explores the use of money
metric utility in a social welfare function. For each application, the simulation
model used is the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer Simulator (MITTS),
the only behavioural microsimulation model for Australia, which is described
brieﬂy in Appendix A. Conclusions are in section 6.
2 The Decomposition Method
Suppose that data are available for two periods, 0 and 1,a n ds u p p o s ei ti s
required to decompose changes in an index of inequality. Disposable (net of
direct taxes and transfers) income is used as the ‘welfare metric’. For conve-
nience, in this section the decompisition is discussed in terms of an inequality
index. However, the same approach can be applied to measures of poverty
or, as shown in the next section, values of a speciﬁed social welfare function.
As explained in the empirical applications below, it is combined with an as-
sumption of equal sharing within households and use of an adult equivalence
scale. Let  () denote the index of interest, calculated under tax structure
. The tax and transfer system (hereafter abbreviated to tax structure) is
summarised by a set of parameters, including the tax rates and thresholds
as well as the level of the transfer payments and their corresponding eligi-
bility rules. In the following analysis the vector of thresholds for period 0 is
always assumed to be adjusted in nominal terms to period 1 values, using an
‘uprating’ factor.
The values of disposable income are based on a population matrix, ,
such that each row contains relevant information about each individual (in-
cluding endogenous labour supply) under the tax regime operating in period
 and for the population dataset of period . Again, in what follows, 0
values are assumed to be uprated to year 1 nominal values, using the same
uprating factor as that used to obtain the corresponding tax threshold val-
ues.6
6Bargain (2010) introduced the uprating factor explicitly, along with a vector of tax and
5The inequality measure can thus be written as:
 () (1)
Importantly,  and  need not necessarily be the same. This means that gross
income is calculated using the labour supply arising from tax structure  for
dataset . This gross income is rescaled (if necessary) so that it is expressed
in year 1 values. Then the tax structure  is applied to those gross incomes in
order to obtain a set of disposable incomes. The inequality measure is then
computed as a function of the resulting disposable incomes.
The assumption is used throughout that the values of  a r e‘ s c a l ei n -
variant’, whereby a homogeneity property holds. That is, the index based on
the tax structure in period 0 using unadjusted tax thresholds and transfer
payments and the unadjusted values of 00, gives exactly the same value as
0 (00), given that the thresholds, transfer payments and incomes are ad-
justed using the same factor.7 Hence the change in the index can be measured
by:
∆ = 1 (11) − 0 (00) (2)
The populations of periods 0 and 1 are clearly diﬀerent, reﬂecting for
example diﬀerences in demographic, occupational, skill and taste character-
istics. Individuals’ labour supplies for a given population under the actual
tax structure operating in that period are clearly observable, but a range of
hypothetical distributions, and thus indexes, can be generated. For example,
the predicted labour supply in period 0 of each individual in the period 1
population can be obtained ‘as if’ the tax regime of period 0 were to exist
in period 1. This kind of counterfactual enables the change in (2) to be
decomposed as follows.
The change in inequality can be divided into the three distinct eﬀects
mentioned above (since the assumption of homogeneity rules out any simple
‘growth eﬀect’). These reﬂect labour supply eﬀects of the tax changes; those
transfer thresholds. However, the notation is clearer once it is recognised that parameters
and disposable incomes are always uprated to the ﬁnal year using a common uprating
factor.
7This homogeneity property was directly tested, using the data discussed below, and
found to hold. Bargain (2009) also found that it holds in the case of the UK.
6arising from the changing structure of the population itself between the two
periods; and ﬁnally the change arising from the change in the tax structure.
In each case, there are several ways to obtain the ceteris paribus requirement,
but these need to follow a particular sequence to ensure that the sum of the
components adds to the total diﬀerence in (2).
Consider the contribution to ∆ due to the labour supply adjustment
to tax policy changes. This is reﬂected in the change in the index, ,
that is attributed to changes in gross incomes arising from labour supply
changes alone. It may be evaluated using diﬀerent populations (datasets)
and diﬀerent tax regimes. Hence the behavioural change is given by:
 =  (1) −  (0) (3)
for  =0 1 and  =0 1. The two terms in this expression diﬀer only in the
tax structure used to obtain labour supply. The combination of diﬀerent tax
regimes used to compute the index  and diﬀerent datasets to obtain labour
supplies means that there are four terms describing behavioural contributions
to the overall change. These are displayed in Table 1.
Table 1: Behavioural Eﬀects: B
Labour supply Tax regime of:
b a s e do ns u r v e y : Y e a r0 Y e a r1
Year 0 0 (10) − 0 (00) 1 (10) − 1 (00)
Year 1 0 (11) − 0 (01) 1 (11) − 1 (01)
Similarly, the contribution to the overall change in inequality contributed
by the change in the structure of the population is measured by a change in
which the only thing to vary is the population dataset. Hence these eﬀects
are given by:
 =  (1) −  (0) (4)
for  =0 1 and basing the gross incomes on the labour supply under the tax
structure, , such that where  denotes the population dataset,  =1when
 =0and  =0when  =1 .T h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n ﬁguration of subscripts
relating to the tax structures used is necessary to ensure that when the
7population eﬀects are combined with the behavioural eﬀects, the appropriate
terms cancel (so that the sum of the three eﬀects is equal to total changes
∆). The two-by-two matrix of four population eﬀects corresponding, cell by
cell, to the behavioural eﬀects is given in Table 2.
Table 2: Other (Population) Eﬀects: P
Labour supply Tax regime of:
b a s e do ns u r v e y : Y e a r0 Y e a r1
Year 0 0 (11) − 0 (10) 1 (11) − 1 (10)
Year 1 0 (01) − 0 (00) 1 (01) − 1 (00)
When examining the contribution attributed to policy changes in the tax
regime alone, the disposable incomes are based either on the tax regime 0
or 1, using its corresponding population dataset. Only two ceteris paribus
changes are relevant here. Hence the tax policy change eﬀects,  are given
in Table 3.
Table 3: Tax Structure (Policy) Eﬀects: T
Tax regime of:
Year 0 Year 1
1 (11) − 0 (11) 1 (00) − 0 (00)
The four decompositions are thus, for  =0 1 and  =0 1:
∆ =  +  + 
= 1 (11) − 0 (00) (5)
Consider, for example, the decomposition ∆00,w h i c h ,b yt a k i n ga p p r o -
p r i a t et e r m sf r o mt h et h r e et a b l e si sg i v e nb y :
∆00 = 0 (10) − 0 (00)
+0 (11) − 0 (10)
+1 (11) − 0 (11)
= 1 (11) − 0 (00) (6)
8The ﬁrst three rows of (6) represent, in turn, the contributions of the behav-
ioural eﬀect, the population eﬀect, and the tax policy eﬀect to the overall
change in the index. The ﬁrst term in the behavioural eﬀect cancels with
t h es e c o n dt e r mi nt h ep o p u l a t i o ne ﬀect and the ﬁrst term in the population
eﬀect cancels with the second term in the tax policy eﬀect. This leaves the
overall eﬀect as in the last line of (6).8
Following Shapley (1953) and Shorrocks (1999), the marginal eﬀects of
each component can be measured by their arithmetic mean values over all























[1 () − 0 ()] (9)
The following section illustrates the approach using data and a microsimu-
lation model for Australia. However, some caution is needed in interpreting
behavioural eﬀects obtained by using such a model. Tax microsimulation
models are partial equilibrium supplys i d em o d e l s . T h u st h e ya r ea b l et o
simulate the eﬀect on each individual’s labour supply of a change in the
tax structure, but they do not allow for demand-side factors or for poten-
tial general equilibrium eﬀects on wage rates. The actual wage rate changes
thus appear as population eﬀects. In addition, tax policy changes may aﬀect
fertility, household formation, migration, educational choice and other vari-
ables which, in the present approach, become subsumed under the population
changes.
8 The population eﬀects,  encompass all eﬀects other than behaviroural eﬀects
or tax structure (policy) eﬀects. They cover a wide range including changes in the age,
occupational, educational and demographic structure. They also include the eﬀect of non-
uniform income growth, for instance, by occupation, sector, region or by income source.
93 Empirical Application: Australia 2000/01
to 2005/06
This section applies the approach described above to changes in inequality
and values of a social welfare function, based on disposable incomes in Aus-
tralia between the ﬁnancial years of 2000/01 and 2005/06. The behavioural
microsimulation model used is the Melbourne Institute Tax and Transfer
Simulator (MITTS). This is a microsimulation model based on a structural
discrete hours approach to labour supply, with a random utility component.9
An important ﬁrst question arises of how to deal with the fact that a prob-
ability distribution over hours for each individual is generated, instead of a
single deterministic level of labour supply. Rather than using the arithmetic
mean hours for each individual, over the discrete hours available for work,
the following application uses the ‘pseudo distribution’ method proposed by
Creedy, Kalb and Scutella (2006) for dealing with the complete distribution.
Table 4: Income Tax Schedules 2000/01 and 2005/06
2000/01 (uprated) 2005/06
Threshold Tax rate Threshold Tax rate
0 — 7,619 0 0 — 6,000 0
7,620 — 25,395 0.17 6001 — 21,600 0.15
25,396 — 63,488 0.30 21,601 — 63,000 0.30
63,489 — 76,186 0.42 63,001 — 95,000 0.42
76,186 0.47 95,000 0.47
Tables 4 and 5 present the changes in the income tax rates and thresholds
a n di nt h em a i nb e n e ﬁt payments, respectively, over the period of interest.
This lists only the main beneﬁt payments but all payments together with
the corresponding eligibility rules are used in the microsimulation model.
To uprate tax and transfer parameters, as well as incomes, to 2005/2006,
a wage index based on average earnings for full-time workers, provided by
the Australian Bureau of Statistics, was used.10 The index increased by
9For a more detailed description of MITTS, see Creedy et al. (2002). Creedy and Kalb
(2006) describe some further features of MITTS.
10See Australian Bureau of Statistics (cat. no. 6302.0, Table 3, series ID A2734023X).
1026.98 per cent during this period. Comparison of the income tax parameters
reveals that only the second tax rate was adjusted between 2000/01 and
2005/06, decreasing by two percentage points. The adjustments in the tax
thresholds were more substantial. The ﬁrst two tax thresholds were reduced
in real terms while the top tax threshold was substantially increased. These
changes in the income tax parameters amount to an increase in the average
income tax rates for (almost) all individuals on gross incomes below $86,000
a year and a decrease in taxes for incomes above this threshold.
Table 5: Changes in Main Beneﬁt Payments Between 2000/01 and 2005/06
Change compared with wage rates:
Payment levels Taper rate
Family Tax Beneﬁt-A 5% above Reduced
Family Tax Beneﬁt-B 5% above Reduced
Age Pension 5% below -
Disability Support Pension 5% below -
Newstart Allowance about 5% below -
Youth Allowance 5% below -
Special Beneﬁt 5% below -
Partner Allowance 5% below -
Family Tax Beneﬁt-A is a transfer payment designed to deal with the
cost of raising children. The beneﬁt withdrawal, or taper, rate for maximum
payment of this beneﬁt fell from 0.3 to 0.2 over the period. Family Tax
Beneﬁt-B is a means-tested extra payment for single parents and families
with one income earner. The taper rate for this beneﬁt also fell from 0.3
to 0.2 over the period. Table 5 shows that while Family BeneﬁtP a y m e n t s
increased faster than the wage index, growth in the other beneﬁtp a y m e n t s
falled behind that of the wage index. The use of a microsimulation model
makes it possible to examine the combined eﬀects of all these changes in the
tax and transfer system.
In combination with these two sets of tax parameters, we use the 2000/01
and the 2005/06 Surveys of Income and Housing Costs (SIHC). Changes in
population size and structure by demographic group between 2000/01 and
2005/06 are described in Table 6, although of course this is only one aspect
11Table 6: Population Size (000s) in 2000/01 and 2005/06
2000/01 2005/06 Change (per cent )
Couples 12,749 13,595 6.22
Single males 2,361 2,459 4.00
Single females 2,077 2,247 7.58
Single parents 1,559 1,531 -1.87
ALL 18,745 19,832 5.48
of the population change. The population totals are obtained using the
SIHC weights, which are also used to obtain the inequality and social welfare
measures reported here. The Australian population increased by 5.48 per
cent over this period but population growth was not homogenous across
demographic groups. Whereas couple families and single females grew at a
faster rate, growth was slower for single males and the group of single parents
experienced a reduction in size.
The inequality measures reported below are Atkinson measures, (),f o r
three values of relative inequality aversion, . The social welfare values are
for the associated abbreviated welfare function,  =¯ (1 − ()),w h e r e¯ 
is the appropriate arithmetic mean disposable income.11 T h eu n i to fa n a l y s i s
throughout is the individual, where each individual in a household is assigned
the total income per adult equivalent. Following Banks and Johnson (1994)
and Jenkins and Cowell (1994), the adult equivalent size, , is obtained using
the following parametric scales:
 =(  + )
 (10)
where  and  are respectively the number of adults and children in the
unit,  is the weight attached to children and  represents the extent of
economies of scale. The weight attached to children, ,w a ss e ta t06 and
the economies of scale parameter was set at  =0 8.12
11The value of the abbreviated welfare function is thus the ‘equally distributed equiva-
lent’ level of disposable income.
12These values produce scales that are similar to the OECD scales: for values corre-
sponding to 29 diﬀerent sets of equivalence scales, see Creedy and Sleeman (2005, pp.
77-79). The sensitivity of the results with respect to the economies of scale parameter is
discussed further below.
12Table 7 shows the baseline disposable income measures, that is 0 (00),
and the total changes in inequality and social welfare between the ﬁnancial
years, 2000/01 and 2005/06. This table shows that, at the aggregate level,
disposable income inequality, as measured by the Atkinson index, has de-
creased for  ≤ 08, and increased for the higher value of  =1 4.A t t h e
demographic group level the results clearly show a reduction in intra-group
inequality for couples, whereas for single males, single females and single
parents there is an increase in intra-group inequality. Both mean dispos-
able income and social welfare increased over the period for all demographic
groups except for single females who experienced a slight reduction in social
welfare. The small increase in mean disposable income was not suﬃcient to
compensate for the increase in inequality.
Table 7: Baseline Disposable Income Measures and Total Changes 2000/01
to 2005/06
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 26,609 0.0264 0.0965 0.1552 25,906 24,041 22,478
Single males 27,751 0.0299 0.1131 0.1859 26,921 24,613 22,593
Single females 23,133 0.0241 0.0904 0.1475 22,575 21,040 19,721
Single parents 18,153 0.0118 0.0442 0.0724 17,939 17,351 16,838
ALL 25,664 0.0268 0.0982 0.1580 24,977 23,144 21,610
Total percentage changes
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 11.21 -7.34 -6.48 -5.28 11.43 11.98 12.29
Single males 5.34 11.64 8.74 7.36 4.97 4.17 3.57
Single females 0.05 11.71 7.83 5.18 -0.24 -0.73 -0.85
Single parents 10.44 48.58 40.45 34.67 9.80 8.37 7.45
ALL 9.42 -0.26 -0.03 0.66 9.42 9.42 9.28
The decomposition of these changes is provided in Table 8. To limit the
size of the table, only the arithmetic mean values obtained from equations (7),
(8) and (9) are reported. All possible decompositions (at the aggregate level)
are presented in Appendix B as an illustration of the extent to which they
can vary. Table 8 presents the eﬀects as percentages of the baseline values for
13each of the three components distinguished. Hence, for each index and each
demographic group, the sum of the behavioural eﬀects, , the population
eﬀects, ,a n dt h ep o l i c ye ﬀects, , is equal to the total changes reported
in Table 7. This means, for example, that the policy eﬀects indicate by how
many percentage points each index would have changed between 2000/01
a n d2 0 0 5 / 0 6i ft h et a xs t r u c t u r ew e r et h eo n l yt h i n gt oh a v ec h a n g e dd u r i n g
this period.
To illustrate, consider the case of single males, for whom Atkinson’s in-
equality measure, for  =0 2, was 0.0299 in 2000/01. This increased by
11.64 per cent between 2000/01 and 2005/06. Although the arithmetic mean
disposable income increased by 5.34 per cent, social welfare increased only
by 4.97 per cent due to the increase in inequality.13 If only the population
had changed, inequality would have increased by 7.42 per cent while social
welfare would have increased by 6.71 per cent. If only the tax structure had
changed, inequality would have increased by 4.79 per cent, and when com-
bined with the reduction in mean disposable income of 1.94 per cent, social
welfare would have fallen by 2.09 per cent. Finally, the changes attributed to
the change in labour supply alone are very small. These imply a reduction in
inequality by 0.57 per cent which, combined with an increase in arithmetic
mean disposable income of 0.33 per cent, implies an increase in social welfare
of 0.35 per cent. The three components of the change in inequality, for this
aversion parameter, add to the total change of 1164 = −057+742+479.14
The results show that population eﬀects account for most of the over-
all increase in social welfare at the aggregate level over this period. These
population eﬀects are the basis of a substantial increase in average dispos-
able incomes accompanied by a limited increase in inequality. As mentioned
above, these population eﬀects cover a wide range so that it is not possible
to attribute their contributions more precisely to any particular factor. By
contrast, the decomposition allows a more precise determination of the con-
tribution of tax policy changes and the induced labour supply adjustments.
13The percentage change in  is the percentage change in mean disposable income
minus the product of (1 − ) and the percentage change in .
14All components were obtained independently, so the fact that they sum precisely to
the change in inequality is a useful check on the computations.
14At the aggregate level, the results show that the changes in the tax and
transfer system had barely any eﬀect on inequality and a very small nega-
tive impact on mean disposable incomes. Behavioural eﬀects contributed to
a small increase in mean disposable incomes and to a reduction in inequal-
ity. This is consistent with labour supply responses to the policy changes
inducing larger labour supply increases for low-income than for high-income
households. Appendix C reports labour supply responses if a change from
the 2000/01 to the 2005/06 tax structure is imposed on the 2000/01 popu-
lation. It is shown that the proportions making a positive change in labour
supply is higher for the lower deciles, with a higher proportion of individuals
reducing labour supply in the higher income groups.
Table 8: Average Eﬀects as Per Cent of Baseline: Disposable Income Mea-
sures
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples B 0.07 -0.44 -0.61 -0.75 0.08 0.14 0.22
P 11.28 -5.11 -3.94 -2.61 11.43 11.76 11.83
T -0.13 -1.79 -1.94 -1.92 -0.08 0.09 0.24
Single males B 0.33 -0.57 -0.54 -0.49 0.35 0.40 0.44
P 6 . 9 57 . 4 24 . 5 33 . 1 46 . 7 16 . 3 26 . 1 6
T -1.94 4.79 4.75 4.70 -2.09 -2.56 -3.03
Single females B 0.37 -0.22 -0.15 -0.08 0.37 0.38 0.38
P 2 . 0 67 . 0 73 . 3 10 . 7 81 . 8 91 . 7 31 . 9 2
T -2.39 4.86 4.66 4.47 -2.50 -2.84 -3.15
Single parents B -0.30 1.44 1.27 1.10 -0.32 -0.36 -0.39
P 10.89 49.72 42.10 36.71 10.24 8.74 7.73
T -0.15 -2.57 -2.92 -3.14 -0.12 -0.01 0.11
ALL B 0.11 -0.33 -0.42 -0.50 0.12 0.16 0.21
P 9 . 9 10 . 1 40 . 4 71 . 1 39 . 9 09 . 8 59 . 6 8
T -0.61 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.60 -0.60 -0.61
The results reveal a large degree of heterogeneity at the demographic
group level. While population changes are overwhelmingly the main contrib-
utors to the increase in social welfare for couples and single parents, policy
15changes play a substantial role for single males and females.15 The popula-
tion eﬀects contributed to a very large increase in inequality among single
parents. This increase is between 36.7 and 49.7 percentage points depending
on the aversion for inequality. This result should be contrasted with the
particularly low initial level of intra-group inequality for single parents (and
the relatively small size of this group).
For both single males and females, tax policy changes had a negative eﬀect
on disposable income and they increased inequality. For single females, the
negative eﬀects of tax policy changes more than oﬀset the positive eﬀects of
the changing structure of the population, resulting in a reduction in social
welfare. The negative policy eﬀects for singles reﬂects, to some extent, the
regressive changes in income taxes discussed above. For couples and single
parents, this eﬀect would have been somewhat oﬀset by the increased levels
of family beneﬁt payments which are largely means tested.
The behavioural responses to these policy changes rarely work in the
same directions as the tax policy eﬀects . For couples, single males and
single females, behavioural eﬀects contributed to a slight increase in social
welfare through a combination of a reduction in intra-group inequality and
an increase in average disposable incomes. Again, this is consistent with
an overall increase in labour supply more concentrated at the low-end than
at the high-end of the income distribution. By contrast, behavioural eﬀects
reduced disposable incomes and increased intra-group inequality for single
parents and thus had a negative eﬀect on social welfare. Hence, for single
parents, the results point toward a reduction in labour supply which was
more pronounced for low-income than for high-income single parents. These
results clearly demonstrate the value of the decomposition, allied with a
behavioural microsimulation model, for understanding changes over time.
Jenkins and Cowell (1994) showed that the eﬀect on inequality of changing
the scale economy parameter, , in the adult equivalence scales cannot be
predicted ap r i o r i .16 In the present context, a reduction in  from 08 to 04
15The point made earlier, that some (non-labour supply and general equilibrium) tax
eﬀects appear in population eﬀects, should also be kept in mind.
16Proﬁles of inquality plotted against  can be U-shaped or reverse J-shaped, the turning
point depending on the correlation between adult equivalent income and household size:
16was found to increase absolute inequality levels but had little eﬀect on the
percentage changes and the decompositions reported above. However, at the
aggregate level, the population eﬀects on inequality were found to be larger
than with  =0 8, resulting in a clear increase in overall inequality between
the two periods for all three values of  (instead of only a small increase for
 =1 4 with  =0 8).
4 Allowing for Leisure
The use of disposable income in inequality and social welfare measures, as in
the previous section, can be described as a ‘non-welfarist’ approach. It con-
centrates on interpersonal comparisons of disposable income. Some judges
may take the view that an allowance should be made for leisure. In the
standard optimal tax literature, this is achieved using a ‘welfarist’ approach
whereby the social evaluation is based on a particular cardinalisation of each
individual’s utility, instead of simply their disposable income. The evalua-
tion function used is typically an additive individualistic Paretean welfare
function deﬁned in terms of individuals’ utilities and satisfying the principle
of transfers (usually with an assumption of constant relative inequality aver-
sion). Hence, if for example the Atkinson inequality measure is used, it is
the same kind of welfare function that is used in the above comparisons, but
uses utility instead of disposable income as the ‘welfare metric’. This kind
of cardinalisation, allowing inter-personal comparisons, raises relatively few
problems in view of the fact that the vast majority of simple optimal tax
models make an assumption of common preferences. Indeed, the only type
of heterogeneity introduced into such models usually relates to abilities, or
wage rates.
The use of a behavioural microsimulation model based on a cross-sectional
survey of households is, however, motivated by a desire to allow for as much
population heterogeneity as possible. A model which accurately reﬂects the
variation in circumstances and tastes found in practice can provide the kind
see Jenkins and Cowell (1994) and Creedy and Sleeman (2005). Hence, inequality can
decrease or increase when  is increased.
17of information that can be used in rational policy debate. However, as men-
tioned earlier it is known that the use of a welfare metric based on a cardi-
nalisation of individual utility is problematic when preferences diﬀer. This
section proposes a non-welfarist approach as a modiﬁcation of the treatment
of disposable income, by allowing for the joint values of disposable income
and leisure.
4.1 A Non-welfarist Approach
As mentioned in the introduction, one approach used to deal with aggre-
gation problems with heterogeneous preferences was taken by Aaberge and
Colombino (2008). They based labour supply behaviour on a discrete hours
structural approach, allowing for preference heterogeneity and a random util-
ity component, as in the MITTS model used here. But in examining social
welfare functions, they used a welfare metric based on re-estimating the pref-
erence function without the observed heterogeneity terms; that is, they ob-
tained a ‘common’ preference function. However, the use of an estimated
‘common’ preference function, or ‘reference preference ordering’ (diﬀerent
from those used to model behaviour) is just one possible approach to con-
structing the welfare metric for each individual.
An alternative approach arises from recognising that the ‘reference pref-
erence function’ can be viewed as being eﬀectively a representation of value
judgements of the independent judge, rather than any concept of utility.
H e n c e ,i ti sp o s s i b l es i m p l yt oi m p o s eaw e l f a r em e t r i cw h i c hi n v o l v e sac o m -
mon evaluation or weighting function applied to all individuals. The func-
tion represents the way the judge makes cardinal interpersonal comparisons.
Since the use of social welfare functions essentially involves investigating the
implications of adopting alternative value judgements, these do not have to
be based on any type of common or estimated preference function. Indeed,
when using a social welfare function in terms of disposable income, of the
form  =
P
 (),w i t h ()=1−(1 − ) for inequality aversion of ,
there is no pretence that () represents a ‘common utility function’, since
it instead reﬂects a particular type of value judgement (such as adherence to
18the ‘principle of transfers’, along with the choice of  as the welfare metric).
In the previous section, the evaluation is based on disposable income, and
is made in precisely this way. If the judge is assumed to take a view about
leisure, then it is possible to use a slightly diﬀerent evaluation function — one
that is a function of both disposable income and leisure. In this framework,
consider welfare functions based on, for each individual, the geometric aver-
age value of disposable income, , and hours of work, . The social welfare












where  is the maximum hours of work, so that  −  denotes leisure over
the relevant period, for income units  =1 .17 Atkinson inequality
measures are thus based on the metric  = 
 ( − )
1−. The use of
disposable income therefore corresponds to taking  =1(that is, ignoring
leisure in the evaluation).
4.2 Empirical Application
This subsection applies the approach described above to the decomposition
of inequality and social welfare changes in Australia between the ﬁnancial
years of 2000/01 and 2005/06, again using the MITTS model. The results
are contrasted with those obtained in the previous section, where leisure was
ignored. Here,  i ss e ta t8 0h o u r sp e rw e e ka n dt h ep a r a m e t e r,r e ﬂecting
the view of the judge regarding the importance of leisure versus income, is
s e ta t0 . 7 .
Table 9 presents the baseline values and total percentage changes in in-
equality and social welfare between 2000/01 and 2005/06 for this welfare
metric, . At the aggregate level, the results show that when the judge takes
a view about leisure, the increase in social welfare over the period is almost
17Alternatively, some judges may evaluate a policy change according to whether it in-
creases the labour supply of certain groups, so that increases in leisure would be considered
‘bad’.
19T a b l e9 :B a s e l i n ef o rW e l f a r eM e t r i ca nd Total Changes 2000/01 to 2005/06:
Alpha=0.7
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 4,162 0.0104 0.0390 0.0646 4,119 3,999 3,893
Single males 4,010 0.0103 0.0390 0.0649 3,969 3,854 3,750
Single females 3,688 0.0071 0.0273 0.0458 3,662 3,587 3,519
Single parents 3,405 0.0043 0.0166 0.0278 3,390 3,348 3,310
ALL 4,027 0.0100 0.0374 0.0618 3,987 3,877 3,778
Total percentage changes: welfare metric with  =0 7
Atkinson index Social Welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 5.99 -5.80 -5.15 -4.35 6.05 6.21 6.31
Single males 1.19 6.91 6.21 5.85 1.12 0.93 0.78
Single females -0.28 16.39 12.45 9.53 -0.39 -0.63 -0.73
Single parents 5.69 49.59 43.71 39.01 5.47 4.92 4.52
A L L 4 . 8 21 . 1 91 . 4 91 . 9 44 . 8 14 . 7 64 . 6 9
halved (compared with results in Table 7 which uses ) and inequality un-
ambiguously increases. This indicates that the increase in the social welfare
function based on disposable income measures was inﬂuenced to a substantial
extent by its neglect of an increase in hours of work, and thus a reduction
in leisure time. At the demographic group level, changes in social welfare
are also reduced by the use of the allowance for leisure in the ‘non-welfarist’
evaluation, but the direction of the changes remains unchanged. In particu-
lar, the increase in social welfare for single males is reduced to 1.12 per cent
for  =0 2 and 0.78 for  =1 2, while it was 4.97 and 3.57 per cent for  of
02 and 14 respectively with disposable income measures.
The decomposition of these changes is presented in Table 10. Population
eﬀects remain the main contributors to the overall changes in social welfare
at the population level and also for couples and single parents, as was the
case with disposable income measures. For single females, the negative policy
eﬀects more than oﬀset the positive population eﬀects, as in previous results.
For single males, policy changes now oﬀset most of the increase in social wel-
fare due to population changes, which explains the reduced increase in social
20Table 10: Average Eﬀects as Per Cent of Baseline: Welfare Metric with
Alpha=0.7
Atkinson index Social welfare
¯  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples B 0.03 -0.55 -0.65 -0.75 0.04 0.06 0.09
P 5.95 -3.56 -2.79 -1.95 5.99 6.07 6.09
T 0.01 -1.68 -1.71 -1.65 0.03 0.08 0.13
Single males B 0.14 -0.39 -0.39 -0.38 0.14 0.15 0.16
P 2.62 1.38 0.58 0.11 2.60 2.59 2.61
T -1.57 5.93 6.02 6.11 -1.63 -1.81 -1.99
Single females B 0.15 -0.21 -0.18 -0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16
P 1.43 10.48 6.62 3.76 1.36 1.25 1.25
T -1.86 6.13 6.01 5.93 -1.90 -2.03 -2.14
Single parents B -0.20 1.09 0.98 0.86 -0.20 -0.21 -0.22
P 5.93 51.28 45.70 41.23 5.70 5.12 4.69
T -0.04 -2.78 -2.97 -3.09 -0.03 0.01 0.05
ALL B 0.04 -0.42 -0.48 -0.54 0.05 0.06 0.08
P 5.16 1.18 1.48 1.86 5.15 5.10 5.03
T -0.38 0.42 0.49 0.62 -0.39 -0.40 -0.42
welfare mentioned above. Table 10 also reveals that behavioural eﬀects are
reduced once the judge takes a view about leisure. Indeed, the contributions
of behavioural eﬀects to disposable income changes are necessarily oﬀset, to
some extent, by the corresponding changes in leisure time, whether labour
supply responses are positive or negative.
5 Money Metric Utility
The acknowledged problems, when preferences diﬀer, of using a welfare met-
ric based on a cardinalisation of individual utilities has been mentioned above.
It is nevertheless worth considering the use, for comparison purposes, of
‘money metric utility’, especially as it continues to be used in some applied
studies. Indeed, as Donaldson (1992, p. 89) stressed, ‘no methodology in
applied welfare economics is perfect. Practical work is always limited by the
availability of data and the problem of estimating the economic consequences
of projects. Diﬀerent evaluation procedures are, therefore, bound to be dif-
21ferentially useful in diﬀerent situations’. The use of a welfare change measure
in a ‘welfarist’ evaluation means that the decomposition method needs to be
modiﬁed slightly, as there are fewer counterfactual processes. This is because
money metric utility is deﬁned in terms of ‘reference prices’, which are held
constant at the base period values so that the end period value is obtained
from the welfare change involved. This cannot be separated from the behav-
i o u r a lc h a n g ei nt h ew a yt h a ti sp o s s i b l ew h e nd i s p o s a b l ei n c o m ei su s e d .T h e
ﬁrst subsection describes a decomposition method for money metric utility,
which is applied in the second subsection below.
5.1 Methodology
This section considers the decomposition of inequality changes in the case
w h e r et h ew e l f a r em e t r i ci sm o n e ym e t r i cu t i l i t y ,, with reference prices set
at period 0’s tax structure. Deﬁne  () as the inequality index based
on the distribution of money metric utility, for period ’s tax structure using
the population dataset of period .
Using period 0 as reference prices, the value of 00 is simply given by
full income in period 0. T h i si sd e ﬁned as the net income which could be
obtained if all the endowment of time were devoted to work at the going net
wage rate. For each income unit, the net income at the assumed maximum
number of hours per week by all adult members of the income unit under
period 0’s tax structure is calculated, giving full income for the income unit.
The term  (10) refers to the inequality measure based on money met-
ric utility for each individual in dataset 0 after the tax change; this is the
value of full income, 00 minus the equivalent variation, ,a r i s i n gf r o m
the tax change; see Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011) and references cited
therein.
In using money metric utility, a separate behavioural eﬀect cannot be
isolated in the way it can be separated for the use of disposable income. In
that case, gross income, arising from one tax structure, could have a diﬀerent
tax structure applied in order to get disposable income. This is not possible
when using money metric utility.
22The term  (11) is the inequality index based on the distribution of
money metric utility in period 1, for population dataset 1. Hence to obtain
this, it is necessary ﬁrst to compute full income for each individual in popu-
lation dataset 1, using the tax structure (appropriately scaled) of period 0,
to get the appropriate full income. Then 11 is obtained as that full income
less the  from the shift to tax structure 1 (for the same population). How-
ever, computationally it is most convenient (given the calibration approach
to microsimulation adopted here) to use the fact that the  for a given
tax change is the negative of the compensating variation for the opposite tax
change.
Consider changes arising from the tax structure change between periods
0 and 1. There are two changes arising from the tax policy eﬀects alone,
depending on whether dataset 0 or 1 is used. These are:
0 =  (10) −  (00) (12)
1 =  (11) −  (01) (13)
for datasets 0 and 1 respectively.
Similarly, there are two decompositions of the population eﬀect, depend-
ing on the tax structure used as base. These are:
0 =  (11) −  (10) (14)
1 =  (01) −  (00) (15)
There are thus two decompositions of the overall change, given by:
∆0 = 0 + 0
= { (10) −  (00)} + { (11) −  (10)}
=  (11) −  (00) (16)
and:
∆1 = 1 + 1
= { (11) −  (01)} + { (01) −  (00)}
=  (11) −  (00) (17)
23The average values of the separate components can thus be obtained as ¯  =
(0 + 1)2 and ¯  =( 0 + 1)2.
Implementation of this approach requires the calculation of welfare changes,
and hence money metric utilities, in the context of a discrete hours approach
with a random utility component. The following analysis uses the approach
proposed by Creedy, Hérault and Kalb (2011). The assumed maximum num-
ber of hours per week was again set at 80 hours of work.
5.2 Empirical Application
In line with the previous applications, this section applies the decomposi-
tion based on money metric utility to inequality and social welfare changes
in Australia between 2000/01 and 2005/06. Baseline money metric values
and total percentage changes are presented in Table 11. The corresponding
decompositions are presented in Table 12.
Table 11: Baseline Money Metric Measures and Changes 2000/01 to 2005/06
Atkinson index Social welfare
Mean  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 56,880 0.0159 0.0569 0.0916 55,978 53,643 51,670
Single males 56,527 0.0115 0.0444 0.0759 55,876 54,017 52,236
Single females 51,489 0.0095 0.0365 0.0622 50,999 49,611 48,284
Single parents 39,615 0.0103 0.0393 0.0655 39,206 38,058 37,020
ALL 54,802 0.0151 0.0552 0.0902 53,973 51,776 49,860
Total percentage changes
Atkinson index Social Welfare
Mean  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples 3.32 -7.95 -4.60 -2.61 3.45 3.60 3.59
Single males -0.08 74.35 46.37 32.32 -0.94 -2.23 -2.73
Single females -3.06 4.45 2.93 0.91 -3.10 -3.17 -3.12
Single parents 0.61 41.72 37.60 34.06 0.17 -0.93 -1.79
ALL 2.22 4.55 4.81 5.02 2.15 1.94 1.72
At the aggregate level, the increase in social welfare observed in the previ-
ous section is further reduced and the increase in inequality is larger. At the
demographic group level, only couples are judged to experience an increase in
24T a b l e1 2 :A v e r a g eE ﬀects as Per Cent of Baseline: Money Metric Measure
Atkinson index Social welfare
Mean  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
Couples P 3.38 -6.49 -2.86 -0.67 3.49 3.56 3.45
T -0.06 -1.46 -1.73 -1.93 -0.04 0.05 0.14
Single males P 0.88 71.08 43.26 29.18 0.04 -1.14 -1.53
T -0.95 3.27 3.11 3.14 -0.99 -1.09 -1.20
Single females P -1.99 2.28 0.69 -1.55 -2.01 -2.01 -1.88
T -1.07 2.17 2.24 2.46 -1.09 -1.16 -1.23
Single parents P 0.69 45.14 41.19 37.75 0.21 -1.01 -1.98
T -0.07 -3.42 -3.59 -3.69 -0.04 0.08 0.19
ALL P 2.51 5.19 5.64 5.96 2.43 2.17 1.90
T -0.28 -0.64 -0.83 -0.94 -0.27 -0.23 -0.19
social welfare, while for all other groups there is a decrease in social welfare
(except for a small increase for single parents for  =0 2). Population eﬀects
remain the main contributors to the total changes in social welfare for couples
and single parents. An important diﬀerence from previous results is that, for
single males and single females, tax policy and behavioural eﬀects reinforce,
rather than oﬀset, population eﬀects. The consequence is that the reduction
in social welfare previously observed for single females is reinforced, while
the increase in social welfare for single males is turned into a clear reduction.
6 Conclusions
This paper provides a framework to decompose changes in inequality, and the
value of its associated social welfare function, for the usual situation in which
cross-sectional survey data are available for two years. The aim is to identify
the separate contributions of population, tax policy and behavioural eﬀects
to the total changes observed over a given period of time. Two ‘non-welfarist’
approaches and one ‘welfarist’ decomposition approach are presented and ap-
plied to Australia over the period 2000/01 to 2005/06, using the behavioural
microsimulation model, MITTS. First, where social welfare is non-welfarist,
deﬁned in terms of disposable income for each individual, the changes were
25decomposed into behavioural, population and tax policy changes, using the
method adopted by Bargain (2010). However, in the context of preference
functions with a random utility component, giving rise to a probability dis-
tribution for each individual over a set of discrete hours levels, the present
approach used a ‘pseudo distribution’ method to obtain a close approxima-
tion to the complete distribution. This contrasts with the use of arithmetic
means for each individual.
The application to Australia revealed that changes in inequality were
small in aggregate, but social welfare increased by about 9 per cent. Most
of the change was attributed to changes in the structure of the population.
However, for separate demographic groups, a wider range of results were
obtained, with single parents in particular experiencing the largest change
in inequality, and with behavioural eﬀects having an inequality-increasing
inﬂuence. For single males and single females, policy eﬀects were found to
be substantial, with a negative impact on social welfare, which oﬀset to a
large extent the positive population eﬀects. The policy-induced behavioural
changes were generally found to act in the opposite direction from the direct
eﬀects of the policy changes.
The decomposition method was then extended to allow for a further non-
welfarist social welfare function in which the independent judge attaches
some value to leisure as well as disposable income. In this approach, a wel-
fare metric was proposed that is equivalent to a weighted geometric mean
of disposable income and leisure. Compared with the absence of any regard
for leisure by the judge, this was generally found to involve larger percent-
age increases in inequality and smaller increases in social welfare. Hence,
although social welfare based on disposable income had increased over the
period, this was partly oﬀset when the associated increase in hours of work
(and the corresponding reduction in leisure time) was accounted for by the
judge.
The diﬃculties of using a welfarist approach in the context of preference
heterogeneity were discussed. The decomposition method was adapted to
deal with the use of money metric utility as the welfare metric in the so-
cial welfare function. In this case a separate behavioural eﬀect could not
26be isolated. The value of money metric utility for each individual was ob-
tained using full income values for the initial period and equivalent variations
resulting from the tax changes. The empirical results contrasted quite sub-
stantially with those obtained for the non-welfarist approaches, particularly
for single males where inequality changes were largely above those obtained
with the non-welfarist approaches.
The analysis has demonstrated the value of a behavioural microsimula-
tion model in gaining a more detailed appreciation of the factors contributing
to measured changes in inequality between two periods. Non-welfarist eval-
uations, either in terms of disposable incomes or some weighted average of
disposable income and leisure, can be carried out, given a model that is ca-
pable of generating the various counterfactuals required. However, further
investigation of methods of carrying out welfarist evaluations in the presence
of preference heterogeneity seems warranted.
27Appendix A: MITTS - The Melbourne Insti-
tute Tax and Transfer Simulator
This appendix provides a brief description of the Melbourne Institute Tax
and Transfer Simulator (MITTS), a behavioural microsimulation model of
direct tax and transfers in Australia. Since the ﬁrst version was completed
in 2000, and described in Creedy et al. (2002), it has undergone a range of
substantial developments; For an overview of refereed publications and books
relating to the MITTS model, see:
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/labour/microsimulation/MITTS-publications.html.
MITTS is based on the Australian Survey of Income and Housing Costs
(SIHC), a representative sample of the Australian population, containing de-
tailed information on labour supply and income from diﬀerent sources, in
addition to a variety of background characteristics of individuals and house-
holds. All results are aggregated to the population level using the household
weights provided with SIHC. Pre-reform net incomes at alternative hours
levels are based on the MITTS calculation of entitlements, not the actual re-
ceipt. Furthermore, MITTS applies only income tests, as there is at present
no asset imputation in the model. All major social security payments, fam-
ily payments, rebates and income taxes are included, ensuring a reasonable
approximation to net income.
MITTS consists of two components. MITTS-A is the arithmetic tax and
beneﬁt modelling component and provides, using the wage rate of each indi-
vidual, the budget constraints that are crucial for the analysis of behavioural
responses to tax changes. For those individuals in the data set who are not
working, an imputed wage is obtained. MITTS-B examines the eﬀects of any
speciﬁed tax reform, allowing individuals to adjust their labour supply. Be-
h a v i o u ri sb a s e do nq u a d r a t i cp r e f e r e n c ef u n c t i o n sw h e r et h ep a r a m e t e r sa r e
allowed to vary with individuals’ characteristics. Individuals are considered
as being constrained to select from a discrete set of hours levels. For singles,
11 discrete points are distinguished. For couples, a joint set of discrete labour
supply points are used. The female hours distribution covers a wider range
of part-time and full-time hours than the male distribution, which is mostly
28divided between non-participation and full-time work. Therefore, women’s
labour supply is divided into 11 discrete points, whereas men’s labour sup-
ply is represented by just 6 points. The joint labour supply of couples is
estimated simultaneously, unlike a popular approach in which female labour
supply is estimated with the spouse’s labour supply taken as exogenous. Thus
for couples there are 66 possible joint labour supply combinations.
Simulations are probabilistic, as utility at each hours level is the sum of a
deterministic component (depending on hours worked and net income) and a
random component. Hence MITTS generates a probability distribution over
the discrete hours levels. The self-employed, disabled, students and those
over 65 have their labour supply ﬁx e da to b s e r v e dh o u r s .S i m u l a t i o n sb e g i n
by recording the discrete hours level for each individual that is closest to the
observed hours level. The deterministic component of utility is obtained using
the parameter estimates of the quadratic preference function. To generate
the random component, a draw is taken from the distribution of the error
term for each hours level (an Extreme Value Type I distribution). The utility-
maximising hours level is found by adding the two components of utility for
each hours level and choosing the hours with the highest utility. Draws from
the error terms are taken conditionally on the observed labour supply; that
is, they are taken in such a way that the optimal pre-reform labour supply is
equal to the actually observed labour supply. As a result, post-reform labour
supply is simulated conditional on the observed pre-reform labour supply. A
user-speciﬁed number of draws is produced.
For the post-reform analysis, the new net incomes cause the deterministic
component of utility at each hours level to change, so using the same set
of draws from the calibration stage, a new set of optimal hours of work is
produced. This gives rise to a probability distribution over the set of discrete
hours for each individual under the new tax and transfer structure.
29Appendix B: Further Details of Decomposi-
tions
Table 13 reports, for the population as a whole, the various decompositions
of changes in the distribution of disposable income. The table illustrates the
wide variations which can arise for the diﬀerent decompositions. In some
cases there are diﬀerences in the direction of changes.
Table 13: All Decompositions: Disposable Income 2000/01 to 2005/06
Mean Atkinson index Social welfare
 =0 2  =0 8  =1 4  =0 2  =0 8  =1 4
1(11) − 0(00) 9.42 -0.26 -0.03 0.66 9.42 9.42 9.28
Behavioural eﬀects
0(10) − 0(00) 0.05 -0.01 -0.11 -0.19 0.05 0.06 0.09
1(10) − 1(00) 0.13 -0.24 -0.36 -0.46 0.14 0.17 0.22
0(11) − 0(01) 0.09 -0.42 -0.49 -0.52 0.11 0.15 0.19
1(11) − 1(01) 0.16 -0.64 -0.73 -0.79 0.18 0.24 0.31
Average 0.11 -0.33 -0.42 -0.49 0.12 0.15 0.20
Population eﬀects
0(11) − 0(10) 9.96 -0.15 0.27 1.02 9.97 9.93 9.75
1(11) − 1(10) 9.94 0.02 0.30 0.91 9.94 9.91 9.76
0(01) − 0(00) 9.91 0.26 0.65 1.35 9.91 9.84 9.64
1(01) − 1(00) 9.91 0.43 0.68 1.24 9.90 9.83 9.65
A v e r a g e 9 . 9 30 . 1 40 . 4 71 . 1 39 . 9 39 . 8 89 . 7 0
Policy eﬀects
1(11) − 0(11) -0.55 -0.10 -0.19 -0.16 -0.54 -0.53 -0.52
1(00) − 0(00) -0.61 -0.04 0.02 0.22 -0.61 -0.61 -0.65
Average -0.58 -0.07 -0.08 0.03 -0.58 -0.57 -0.58
30Appendix C: Labour Supply Responses
As an example of labour supply responses, Table 14 shows, for males and fe-
males, the percentage changes in hours worked per week. These are obtained
for changes from the 2000/01 to the 2005/06 tax structure, imposed on the
2000/01 population. The changes are given for deciles of the distribution of
net income unit income per adult equivalent under the baseline.
Table 14: Labour Supply Responses: Tax Change Imposed on 2000/01 Pop-
ulation
Decile Females Males
Negative Zero Positive Negative Zero Positive
1 0.1 70.5 29.4 0.2 64.0 35.8
2 0.0 91.0 9.0 0.3 85.3 14.4
3 0.6 79.6 19.7 5.6 72.0 22.4
4 5.5 61.6 32.9 12.5 60.5 27.0
5 12.6 65.0 22.4 16.4 66.9 16.7
6 25.6 55.2 19.2 21.5 60.4 18.1
7 29.1 52.0 18.9 24.6 58.5 16.9
8 32.6 48.3 19.0 27.0 53.9 19.1
9 36.2 47.9 15.9 34.0 47.7 18.3
10 33.6 41.7 24.8 28.5 45.5 26.0
TOTAL 17.1 61.7 21.1 18.2 60.0 21.8
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